Valid Existing Rights: Contingent and Equitable Rights--Not Real Property Rights (Another Attempt at a Definition) by McElfish, James M., Jr.
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 5 
Issue 3 Journal of Mineral Law & Policy, volume 
5, issue 3 
Article 11 
January 1990 
Valid Existing Rights: Contingent and Equitable Rights--Not Real 
Property Rights (Another Attempt at a Definition) 
James M. McElfish Jr. 
Environmental Law Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
McElfish, James M. Jr. (1990) "Valid Existing Rights: Contingent and Equitable Rights--Not Real Property 
Rights (Another Attempt at a Definition)," Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 5 : Iss. 3 
, Article 11. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol5/iss3/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Valid Existing Rights: Contingent and
Equitable Rights-Not Real Property
Rights (Another Attempt at a
Definition)
BY JAMES M. McELFISH, JR.*
Few phrases in environmental law have occasioned as much
controversy and perennial hand-wringing as the "valid existing
rights" (VER) provision in Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA).' It has under-
gone an eleven-year history of regulatory definitions and rede-
finitions, court struggles, and political maneuvering.
This 1990 symposium on VER is a worthwhile attempt by
the Office of Surface Mining and others interested in the envi-
ronment and the coal industry to determine whether this hot
potato is edible, or will occasion yet another decade of indiges-
tion. It's clear that we'd better keep the bicarbonate of soda on
hand.
As everyone even remotely interested in the question knows,
Section 522(e) was Congress' proscription of "surface coal min-
ing operations" after August 3, 1977 on certain lands affected
with particular environmental or public health and safety inter-
ests. These lands were:
(1) "any lands within the boundaries of units of the National
Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the Na-
tional System of Trails, the National Wilderness Preservation
System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System [including study
rivers] ..... and National Recreation Areas."
(2) "Federal lands" within the boundaries of National Forests.
(However, underground mines and some surface mining may
be authorized if certain determinations are made by the Sec-
* Mr. McElfish is a Senior Attorney with the Environmental Law Institute, a non-
profit research, policy, and educational institution, where he also directs the Institute's
Center on Surface Coal Mining. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author.
I Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
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retaries of Interior and Agriculture.)
(3) "any publicly owned park or places included in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Sites" that would be "adversely"
affected, unless approved by the regulatory authority and the
agency with jurisdiction over the site.
(4) within 100 feet of a public road (subject to waiver).
(5) within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling (unless waived by
the owner), within 300 feet of a public building, school, church,
community, or institutional building, or public park, or within
100 feet of a cemetery.
2
The proscription of surface coal mining in these areas does
not apply to operations in existence on August 3, 1977, and is
"subject to valid existing rights." Congress did not define the
term.
So WHAT Dm CONGRESS MEAN?
Despite scholarly attempts to elucidate a VER definition
from various fragments of SMCRA's legislative history, it is
most likely that Congress didn't really know what it meant by
the term. "Valid existing rights" (VER) was a term used in
public land statutes throughout the 20th century. It was ordi-
narily used when Congress changed the statutory management
policies applicable to federal lands, but wanted to protect the
holders of certain private interests therein.
In enacting SMCRA Section 522(e), Congress clearly wanted
to eliminate surface coal mining in specific areas. Indeed, this
Section is the remnant of what had begun as a bill designed to
ban "strip mining" altogether. In enacting the limited ban,
however, Congress deemed it wise to "grandfather" some min-
eral interests in the interest of justice. Congress used a phrase it
had used before.
Mineral Leasing Act VER
One early use of the phrase was Section 37 of the Mineral
Land Leasing Act (MLA) of 1920.1 Under the MLA, certain
minerals were designated as no longer "locatable" under the
Mining Law of 1872. Thus, prospectors could no longer go forth
on the public lands and establish mining claims for these min-
2 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
Act of 1920. 41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1988)).
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erals through location of valuable deposits. In extinguishing this
opportunity, Section 37 preserved "valid claims existent" on the
date of the MLA. In 1970, the Supreme Court held that in order
to maintain the continuing validity of claims-as against the
government's contention that these had been extinguished-the
owners of these claims had to have performed annual "assess-
ment work." ' 4 The decision showed that given a statutory policy
to recapture lands to government use-in this case, for disposi-
tion through leasing-the holder of a claim had to take active
steps to maintain the interest.
FCLAA and FLPMA VER
Congress used the term VER several times in the 1970s-not
only in SMCRA (enacted in 1977 after two earlier tries in 1974
and 1975), but also in the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments
Act of 1975 (actually enacted in 1976) (FCLAA), and the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).5
Section 4 of FCLAA amended Section 2(b) of the Mineral
Leasing Act, 6 to abolish preference right leasing of coal "subject
to valid existing rights." The courts have interpreted this phrase
to find VER in instances where the Secretary lacked "discretion"
under prior law to deny a lease because the holder of the interest
had satisfied the statutory conditions for action. 7 Thus, under
FCLAA, VER was a right against the Secretary created by the
activities of the person in possession under previous law.
4 Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970). Previously, a failure to perform
the required annual assessment work had resulted only in the invalidity of a claim as to
a subsequent re-locator of the mineral; the claim remained valid as against the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (FCLAA), Pub.L.No. 94-377,
90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988)); Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub.L.No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(1988)). Congress also used "valid existing mineral rights" in the 1976 Mining in the
Parks Act, but not to preserve rights. Rather, the phrase defined which interests were
subject to regulation under the Act. Mining in the Parks Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
429, 90 Stat. 1342 (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988)).
6 Pub.L No. 94-377, § 4, 90 Stat. 1083 (amending, subject to VER, The Mineral
Lands Leasing Act, § 2(b), codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988)).
' American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 434 F. Supp. 1035 (W.D. Wyo. 1977)(VER
requires prospecting permit, not just application for prospecting permit); Peabody Coal
Co. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Wyo. 1979) (prospecting permit plus pending
application for preference right lease is VER). Cf. Peterson v. Department of Interior,
510 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1981) (application for extension of prospecting permit can
create VER where such permits had been routinely extended prior to FCLAA).
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VER also appeared in Section 701(h) of FLPMA.8 The In-
terior Department's Solicitor defined VER under FLPMA as
"those rights short of vested rights that are immune from denial
or extinguishment by Secretarial discretion. ' 9 Apart from pos-
sible quibbles over whether such rights are "vested" or not, this
is a substantially correct statement. At least one case under
FLPMA has suggested that VER under that Act may be coex-
tensive with interests protected by the Fifth Amendment. 10 How-
ever, otherwise valid claims can be extinguished without
compensation because of the contingent nature of the right."
VER requires action by the holder to maintain it.
VER AS AN EQUITABLE RIGHT
In each instance, VER has been identified as an equitable
right enforceable against the government, not as a type of real
property. As used by Congress prior to SMCRA, VER was
always:
(1) less than an absolute property right;' 2 that
(2) required active exploitation for its maintenance.
The difficulty in applying this traditional type of VER to SMCRA
arises because under Section 522(e), regulators must deal with
some mineral interests that:
(1) are property rights; that
(2) were not actively exploited as of August 3, 1977.
If, in the traditional use of the term VER, the active exploi-
tation component were merely a substitute for "property," then
VER should exist wherever coal is owned or leased by anyone
8 FLMPA § 701 (h), 43 U.S.C. 1701 note (1988).
9 Solicitor's Opinion M-36910 (Supp.), 88 I.D. 909, 912 (1981).
10 Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 327 (E.D. Cal. 1985): "[E]ither the
interest is a valid existing right protected by the property provision of the due process
clause and unaffected by this litigation or it is not, and thus is not subject to due process
protection."
" United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (claims extinguished for untimely
annual notice).
11 Unlike fee interests, invalid claims were subject to contest and cancellation. The
government always retained the ability to determine the validity or the invalidity of the
right. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963) (condemnation of
mining claims to build government dam properly addressed only possession; validity of
claims deferred to administrative determination).
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(viz.-where property exists). However, this construction is not
satisfactory for at least three reasons:
First, requirements of exploitation were not simply a guar-
antee of property interests, but rather were a positive social goal
of prior law. This is not only true of mining claims. Indeed,
even mineral leases-clearly property interests-have diligence
requirements to ensure their exploitation.
Second, exploitation is properly understood as the "condi-
tion" for government recognition of the private "equitable"
right. VER has always been based on what discretion the gov-
ernment had with respect to an interest, not on the law of real
property. Thus, it is a contingent right.
Third, if ownership were the entire test, the Section 522(e)
prohibition would bar no activity whatsoever in 522(e) areas-
except outright theft of coal. This was clearly not the purpose
of this section.
It is more likely that both elements recognized in prior VER
law-the right, and the attempt to exploit it-remain at the core
of VER as used in SMCRA.
VER REQUIRES BOTH A POSSESSORY INTEREST AND
EXPLOITATION
This excursion through VER definitions is one that OSMRE
did not take in 1979. At that time, OSMRE gave up any attempt
to reconcile prior VER law with SMCRA, citing two reasons:
First, SMCRA involved private property interests in both
surface and minerals. There was no precedent in prior VER law
for this circumstance. As noted above, such law had always
dealt with federal lands, and involved less than a fee interest in
the minerals.
Second, OSMRE found Section 522(e) VER different because
the Act had changed the nature of coal "ownership." Specifi-
cally, OSMRE noted that ownership of coal-even on private
property in a non-522(e) area-no longer guaranteed the owner
a right to mine it. In fact, mining was prohibited if reclamation
could not be accomplished successfully. 3
0 This pillar of OSMRE's rationale has, with some justification, been criticized
in the literature. See Note, "Regulation and Land Withdrawals: Defining 'Valid Existing
Rights'," 3 J. MIN. LAW & POL'Y. 517, 543-545 (1988) (rather than determining the
nature of the right under prior law, and then determining the effect of new regulation
thereon, OSMRE looked to the regulation to determine the existence of the right).
1989-90]
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Thus, OSMRE reasoned, the meaning of VER as used in
Section 522(e) would have to be determined without reference
to prior usage. OSMRE was wrong. While somewhat different
in application, SMCRA's use of the term VER can be interpreted
consistently with prior usage. Such prior usage suggests a two-
element test: (1) a possessory interest, and (2) an attempt to
exploit it.
This test means that the person seeking to establish VER
must have a possessory interest (fee ownership, a lease, etc.) and
have made some effort to exploit that interest as of the time the
Section 522(e) prohibition went into effect.
Although not basing its 1979 rule on prior usage of the term
VER, OSMRE's solution was consistent with the foregoing anal-
ysis. The "all permits" and "needed for and adjacent to" for-
mulations contain both elements. 4 The judicial amendment of
the standard to a "good faith" attempt to obtain "all permits,"
is also consistent with this analysis. 5
These are not the only possible approaches. It may be that
other investments of resources and efforts to bring coal property
into production could satisfy the second prong of the test. How-
ever, the second prong cannot be ignored. Mere ownership is
not enough.
CAN VER BE ALIENATED?
Based on prior usage, it appears that VER can be alienated.
Just as mining claims could be sold, and permits transferred, so
could the VER those conferred. Indeed, in Hickel v. Oil Shale
Corp. ,16 the 1970 Supreme Court case dealing with the issue, the
claimants were not the original locators, but rather purchasers
who had acquired the claims after the Mineral Leasing Act had
cut off further locations.
However, VER must be maintained according to the two-
element test. If the prior owner has failed to maintain the right,
11 OSMRE arrived at these tests through reasoning by analogy that if a Section
522(a) administrative designation of lands unsuitable for surface coal mining could be
prevented only by "substantial legal and financial commitments," a congressional des-
ignation under Section 522(e) demanded no less a showing for VER. See 44 Fed. Reg.
14991-14992 (1979).
11 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. I, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. 1083
(D. D.C., 1980).
-6 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
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then there is no right against the federal government to trans-
fer-although the real property interest may, of course, be trans-
ferred.
BUT ISN'T THIS ALL A TAKING UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?
In its historic uses, VER was primarily a "fairness" concept
dealing with government recognition of rights, rather than a
"taking" concept. However, any formulation of VER obviously
remains subject to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Concern over takings,, however, does not mean that Congress
did not intend in Section 522(e) to impair private property rights.
It is absolutely clear that it did.
For example, subsections (e)(1) and (2) reflect the application
of the ban to federal land management units. Yet, while surface
coal mining is excluded from "federal lands within the bound-
aries of any national forest" in (2), it is excluded from "any
lands within the boundaries" of national parks and other units
in (1). (emphasis added). This distinction shows that Congress
intended Section 522(e) to impair the exploitation of some wholly
private property interests. For example, areas within a National
Park boundary not yet acquired by purchase are clearly included
in the ban. If VER saved "all" such rights, the distinction
between (1) and (2) would have been rendered meaningless.
A proper definition of VER need not avoid all takings.
Section 522(e) apparently goes at least as far as the takings
limitation in prohibiting mining in designated areas, but the
takings clause is not the outer boundary of the definition.
A look at "takings" implications does, however, further
illustrate the weakness in the "ownership" plus "right to mine
by the method proposed" test proposed by OSMRE in December
1988.17 That test would have stoppedOSMRE from prohibiting
mining in a significant number of Section 522(e) areas where the
prohibition of mining would clearly not be a taking, i.e., within
300 feet of occupied dwellings, within 100 feet of a public road,
etc. In these areas mining can be readily prohibited under the
"police power" with no taking whatsoever.' 8 Thus, any VER
" 53 Fed. Reg. 53347 (1988).
" See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
The areas identified in Section 522(e) (3), (4), and (5) are the sort of interests frequently
protected by police power regulation.
1989-901
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definition that guarantees a right to mine in these areas clearly
exceeds the protection offered by the Fifth Amendment. Section
522(e) reflects Congress' intent to exercise all of its prohibitory
powers; an ownership and right-to-mine test conflicts with this
intent.
Section 522(e) may impair private property rights in many
instances with no takings. However, a bright-line VER standard
may, as applied, sometimes occasion a taking. The courts are
capable of fashioning appropriate relief in such instances. In
some circumstances, compensation may be the appropriate rem-
edy. In others, the prohibition may be held invalid as applied.
CONCLUSION
The use of the term "VER" in SMCRA presents some
puzzles in interpretation, but these may be resolved consistent
with Congress' previous uses of the term. VER is contingent
upon both a possessory interest and an attempt to exploit the
coal. While in some instances, the denial of VER may produce
a "taking," the mere occurrence of a taking does not require a
finding of VER. Rather, it presents a case for a judicial remedy.
[VOL. 5:623
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APPENDIX A
RECOMMENDATIONS
Should OSMRE attempt a redefinition of VER incorporating
the two-prong test, it should recognize several additional consid-
erations:
(1) Ownership of coal and possession of the "right to mine"
it by a particular method cannot constitute VER. If this were
the case, Section 522(e) would bar only (1) theft of coal and
(2) use of methods not authorized by deed or contract. Neither
of these appears to have been a primary goal of Congress in
either SMCRA as a whole or in Section 522(e) in particular.
(2) Section 522(e) is best understood as the legislative remnant
of a multi-year legislative process that had begun as an attempt
to ban strip mining altogether in all locations. We may infer
that Congress intended to go as far as legislatively possible in
prohibiting mining in the specifically enumerated areas.
(3) A bright-line test is easiest to apply administratively.
APPENDIX B
TAKINGS IMPLICATIONS OF COMMON VER DENIAL SCENARIOS
This appendix illustrates takings determinations that may be
necessary where VER is not established. It assumes the continued
use of the "good faith-all permits" test (or a similar test). All
of the fact patterns assume private ownership of the coal and
the right to mine it by the method proposed.
Illustration 1. Private surface and private coal within the
boundaries of a wild and scenic river; no attempt to exploit coal
prior to 1977 (or prior to creation unit boundaries)-
Denial of VER under this fact pattern would not result in a
taking if the resource could be exploited through conventional
underground mining. Nor would it result in a taking if re-
maining valuable uses of the surface prevented the prohibition
from substantially destroying the value of the property. How-
ever, if the coal were a separate estate and could only be
extracted through surface mining or subsidence-causing under-
ground mining,19 the courts could determine that Section 522(e),
'1 This paper is not intended to address the issue of the applicability of Section
522(e) to subsidence. However, it appears that subsidence is a "surface impact of an
underground mine" within the meaning of Section 701(28) [see 516(b)(1)] and is thus
covered by the prohibition. The most common conflict is the undermining of occupied
dwellings. As Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470, has demonstrated, such undermining can be
prohibited without causing a "taking."
1989-901
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as applied, would cause a taking. Compensation is an appro-
priate remedy. If compensation is unavailable, then the court
may order the regulatory authority to allow the mining to
occur.
Illustration 2. Public building or occupied dwelling, private
coal; no attempt to exploit coal prior to 1977-
Prohibition is not a taking because of police power. Keystone.
20
Illustration 3. Private coal on federal lands within a national
forest; no attempt to exploit coal prior to 1977-
Mining may be authorized by Secretary under Section 522(e)(2).
If not authorized, the prohibition may be a taking (if coal
cannot be exploited by underground mining).
w 480 U.S. 470.
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